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Abstract 
We investigate the roles of individual characteristics and punishment progressivity on crime. Our 
analysis reconciles low crime rates with light punishments in self-governed communities (Ostrom, 
1990), using formal punishments to deter crime (Becker, 1968). We use a novel trial dataset on water 
stealing from a self-governed community in Mula, Spain. We present a model with predictions 
consistent with farmers' behavior in Mula: (i) judges trade off crime deterrence and insurance, 
recognizing that minimizing crime could be socially inefficient; (ii) punishments depend on the 
defendant's and victim's characteristics; (iii) recidivists are punished harsher than first time offenders 
for the same crime. 
 
JEL Codes: C13, L14, N43, K14, K42. 
Keywords: Crime, Punishment, Enforcement of Law, Self-governed communities.  
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“[Jean Valjean] asked himself whether human society could have the right to force its 
members to suffer equally in one case for its own unreasonable lack of foresight, and in 
the other case for its pitiless foresight; and to seize a poor man forever between a defect 
and an excess, a default of work and an excess of punishment.” 
Victor Hugo, Les Misérables. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Classical criminology analysis, since the seminal work by Becker (1968), argues that harsh 
punishments are the best crime deterrent. This is the case if the objective of the social planner is to 
minimize crime and punishment is costless. There are situations, however, where allowing specific 
types of crimes can increase social welfare by providing, for example, insurance of last resort. 
Consider the case of farmers who need to irrigate their trees, but might be liquidity constrained (we 
describe these farmers in more detail later). These farmers had two options to irrigate their trees: buy 
water at the auction, or irrigate without permission thus committing a crime. A poor, liquidity 
constrained farmer who has never stolen water may face an unusual temporary negative shock, such 
as a drought. A harsh punishment would deter the farmer from stealing water, but the farmer's trees 
would wither. A mild punishment, would allow the poor farmer to steal water during the negative 
shock, saving the farmers' trees. If the punishment is always mild, though, even farmers not subject to 
the negative shock would steal water. However, punishing recidivists more harshly will deter 
opportunistic farmers from stealing water today, when they do not need it. Such a progressive 
punishment system, which accounts for the criminal history of the individual, is more efficient than a 
system that always imposes a harsh punishment, because the option to steal water during a drought, 
acts as an insurance of last resort for liquidity constrained farmers. 
In this article, we investigate the roles of individual characteristics and punishment progressivity 
in the determination of crime and welfare using a novel dataset of trials from a self-governed 
community of farmers.1 Ostrom (1990, 1992) emphasized that, in self-governed communities, low 
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 By punishment progressivity we mean that recidivists are punished harsher than first t ime offenders fo r  th e sam e cr ime.  The cr imes 
analyzed in this article refer to property theft (stealing water as explained below) as opposed to, e.g., murder. 
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crime can be sustained with mild formal punishments if informal punishments, such as shame, 
humiliation, and social ostracism, are present. As Ostrom (1990, p. 69) emphasizes: 
“For at least 550 years, and probably for close to 1,000 years, farmers have continued to 
meet with others sharing the same canals for the purpose of specifying and revising the 
rules that they use, selecting officials, and determining fines and assessments.” 
In our setting, however, small fines coexist with low crime rates without the need of informal 
punishments.2 We present a dynamic model, described below, where recidivists are punished harsher 
than first time offenders. This allows us to reconcile low crime rates with low punishments in our 
self-governed community, similar to Ostrom (1990), using a dynamic framework with formal 
punishments, similar to Becker (1968) and the literature that followed. To the best of our knowledge, 
we are the first to emphasize the role of punishment progressivity in self-governed communities. 
Our dataset contains information from trials of farmers charged with violating the bylaws of the 
self-governed community of Mula (Murcia), Spain, from 1851 to 1948. On October 2nd, 2009 The 
Council of Good Men (Tribunal de los Hombres Buenos), the Water Tribunal in Murcia, was 
inscribed on the Representative list of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by the United 
Nations (UNESCO, 2009).3 The water tribunals in Murcia and Valencia, the two main cities in the 
region, were recognized as representing all the irrigation communities in the region, including the one 
we study in Mula. The tribunal provided justice when conflicts among farmers arose. Water rights in 
Mula, unlike in most towns in the area, were not attached to land rights. In the region, the scarce 
factor was water, not land. This circumstance created inequality between the (wealthy) owners of 
water rights, and the (poor) owners of land rights. Among the farmers, in 1955 over 90 percent of 
them owned their land (Donna and Espín-Sánchez, 2018b). The system survived, however, for over 
                                                                 
2
 Although informal punishments are not observed in our setting, our analysis remains valid absence these informal punishments.  
3
 Note that UNESCO translated the name of the tribunal as “Council of Wise Men” instead of “Council of Good Men,” which would be th e 
proper translation. The distinction is important because the tribunal is not composed of Wise Men, but of farmers whose role is to in crease 
welfare by being merciful, thus Good Men. A summary and video can be found in the UNESCO webpage, here. 
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seven centuries. Our analysis helps explain this extraordinary stability of the irrigation community in 
Mula. The criminal system combined protection of water and land property rights, with punishments 
that minimized crime while creating insurance of last resort for the farmers. 
Most of these conflicts resulted from farmers irrigating without the right to do so, reducing water 
available to other farmers. Both stealing water and detecting the theft were straightforward in this 
environment. Farmers could steal water by opening the gate of the canal next to their land, allowing 
the water to flow into their parcel. Moreover, monitors could easily identify an illegally-flooded 
parcel from a farmer who did not buy water for that specific day and time, conditional on rainfall. In 
this setting, a harsh punishment system, such as high fines or prohibition of future water purchases, 
would deter farmers from stealing water. Conversely, a mild punishment system, such as a small fee, 
would favor high crime rates. As noted by Glick (1967, p. 56), for Castellon: “the actual fines 
assessed were very low (a few pennies at the most) and also variable, depending on the gravity of the 
offense, on general economic conditions, and probably on the individual's ability to pay.” The 
punishment system in our empirical setting was characterized by three empirical regularities. First, 
judges imposed low punishments on poor farmers based on individual characteristics. Second, judges 
imposed low punishments for first time offenders. Third, judges' punishments were progressive, in 
that recidivists were punished more harshly than first time offenders.4 This system resulted in both 
small average fines and low crime rates, as discussed below. 
To analyze welfare, we present a model with rational and forward-looking farmers who respond 
to judges' optimal punishment in a dynamic setting. We introduce two features motivated by the 
empirical regularities of our setting. First, we allow a transitory individual state, unobservable to the 
judge, to be correlated with a public signal. The transitory individual state captures whether the 
farmer needs water, or is needy. The public signal captures the state of the environment, such as 
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 Judges have full discretion on the amount of the fines in the trials up to the maximum established in the ordinances, 25 pesetas in  Mula,  
equivalent to a weekly wage. Fines were low, 5 pesetas on average, equivalent to a daily wage. In addition to the fine, the accused h ad t o  
pay the value of the water stolen. The fine is not correlated with the value of the water stolen.
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whether there is a drought or a dry month. Second, we introduce a persistent individual state. The 
persistent individual state captures whether the farmer is dishonest, or greedy. Greedy farmers suffer 
less from punishment when they steal water. The judge is benevolent, rational, and forward looking. 
The optimal punishment imposed by the judge depends on the information available, which includes 
public signals, farmers' individual characteristics, and farmers' criminal history.5 The first feature of 
the model generates an optimal punishment that depends on individual characteristics. It rationalizes 
the first empirical regularity of the setting, that judges rarely impose harsh punishment to poor 
farmers. The second feature of the model generates punishment progressivity as an optimal 
punishment system. It rationalizes the second and third empirical regularities of the setting, that 
recidivists are punished more harshly than first time offenders. Consistent with the data in our setting, 
our model predicts that small average fines coexist with low crime rates, in contrast to typical 
criminology analysis using a static Beckerian framework. The low average fine is a weighted average 
of many small fines for first time offenders and a few large fines for recidivists. When a farmer is 
caught stealing the first time, the fine is low. However, the farmer loses the option value of stealing 
“for free” in the future, when the farmer may need the water the most due to a contingency, such as a 
drought. Losing this option value, acts as a harsh punishment, thus deterring crime. Our model also 
predicts that recidivists are more likely to be greedy than first time offenders. This is because the 
greedy type is permanent while the needy type is not. The main insight is that differences in water 
needs are “washed away” after a heavy rain, while differences in greed are not. 
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is to reconcile low crime rates with light 
punishments in self-governed communities (Ostrom, 1990), using formal punishments to deter crime 
(Becker, 1968). To do that, we bring together a novel dataset with a new model, where judges trade 
off crime deterrence and water insurance. We show that the predictions of the model are consistent 
with farmers' behavior in Mula. First, fines are larger during a dry month, when the benefits of 
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 Note that there are two dimensions of heterogeneity among farmers. We define efficiency based on their need of water, not on their greed. 
However, in equilibrium the optimal punishment punish greedy farmers more harshly.
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stealing are higher. Second, fines are larger when the defendant has a Don honorific title, reflecting 
the lower probability of needing water.6 Third, fines are lower when the victim has a Don honorific 
title, reflecting the lower damage inflicted to a Don, who typically has more water and a lower 
marginal return on it their larger supply of water. 
Related Literature 
Our work is closest to that of historians studying irrigation communities in Mediterranean Spain. 
Alberola Romá (2015), among others, argues that Wittfogel's (1957) theory of “hydraulic empire” 
does not apply to the irrigation communities in Mediterranean Spain. Glick (1967) studies irrigation 
communities in medieval Castellon. Garrido (2011b, 2012) studies the irrigation communities near 
Castellon, Borriana, and Villareal. Calatayud (2016) and Sanchis-Ibor (2016) study irrigation 
communities in Mediterranean Spain during the 19th century. These irrigation communities, and the 
one we study in Mula, were governed by (elected) local boards that assigned water rights and meted 
out punishments. Ostrom (1990, 1992) describes eight principles of good governance that self-
governed institutions should follow. However, as Garrido (2011a) notes, the Spanish orchards that 
make up the irrigation communities do not follow all Ostrom's principles. We contribute to this 
literature by studying an additional factor that explains the survival of the self-governed institutions 
for centuries: the criminal system. As Ostrom (1990, p. 69), emphasizes: “Despite this high potential 
for conflict-and its actual realization from time to time-the institutions devised many centuries ago 
for governing the use of water from these rivers have proved adequate for resolving conflicts, 
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 Don (male) or Doña (female) are an honorific title in Spanish. They are used with the person's name, e.g., Don Juan Zapata. Or iginally,  
they were reserved for the aristocracy in Spain. During the period under analysis the terms also encompassed h igh - rank  civil  serv ants,  
wealthy persons, or people with college degree. During our period of analysis, about 5 -10 percent of the population was called Don /Doña . 
The term also encompassed high ranking civil servants, the wealthy, and the college-educated. Hence, it  is believed that a Don never needed 
to steal water. 
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allocating water predictably, and ensuring stability in a region not normally associated with high 
levels of stability.”7  
Ostrom (1990) has extensively studied the benefits of self-governing institutions. The Hobbesian 
legal centralism theory has been also criticized by Ellickson (1991), among others. For example, 
there are situations in which people are not constrained by formal legal institutions (Posner, 2000), 
but rather by commonly agreed social norms. These situations usually arise because of incomplete 
rules, when the law does not specify all possible contingencies or a mechanism to certify them. The 
solution is then to allow flexibility on the judge's ruling. We explain that fines are lower than the 
maximum permissible in Mula using a mechanism similar to the one in Polinsky and Shavell (2000). 
In their case, the punishment could be reduced by considerations of fairness. Our analysis focuses on 
purely on efficiency. The optimal system, however, increases fairness while maximizing efficiency. 
In the presence of liquidity constraints, the market would not allocate water efficiently (Donna and 
Espín-Sánchez, 2018b). The main contribution to this literature is to show how the system of self-
governance, via elected judges, was efficient. Thus, it helps to explain the survival of these 
institutions for centuries, until today. It also helps to explain why these communities thrived in 
international markets throughout the 20th century. Garrido (2010) expands the argument by Morilla 
Critz et al. (1999) that early 20th century irrigation communities in Spain remained labor intensive. 
This is remarkable given the competition from (capital intensive) Californian producers in European 
markets. 
This article is also related to the literature in anthropology and sociology regarding irrigation 
communities. We believe the framework proposed here could be adapted to study such settings. We 
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Glick (1967) uses two cross sections of fines (1443 and 1486), which are far apart, to cross check individuals. We use a continuous p an el 
spanning a century, which allow us to follow individuals over time and check for recidivists. Crimes in Glick (1967) are more common than  
in our case. He finds recidivists within the same year, some of them committing multiple crimes in the same year, but none of them receives 
a large punishment. We do not find a recidivist committing a crime more than once in the same year. Finally, he finds no relation bet ween 
the severity of the punishment and the socioeconomic status of the thief, contrary to our case.
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show that in the Mula irrigation community, the stability and fairness of the system is the result from 
formal, rather than informal, punishments. This is an important feature of our setting because 
informal punishments are difficult to measure.8 Gray (1963) studies an irrigation community in 
Tanganika, where only individuals with the highest status were guaranteed water rights. Individuals 
with no rights had to buy or steal water. If they were caught, the punishment was a flat fee. Gray 
(1963) also emphasizes that “since water theft is usually actuated by dire necessity there is little 
moral stigma attached to [it],” unlike other crimes. Mula farmers also faced little moral stigma for 
stealing water.9 Unlike Gray (1963), we find that higher-status individuals received heavier 
punishments than regular citizens. Self-governing irrigation communities also developed other ways 
for farmers to use water without paying for it. Allen (1965) emphasizes how the Chagga people, also 
in Tanzania, had “days of petition,” when farmers in dire need would ask water owners to use their 
water. Finally, even communities where theft was not uncommon might not have a specialized court, 
as Coward (1976) shows for Laos.10  
Pérez Picazo (2002) studies how conflict in Mediterranean's irrigation communities between 
farmers (owners of land) and Waterlords (owners of water rights) increased over the course of the 
19th century. The increase in irrigable land, due to the construction of new dams, meant that in times 
of scarcity more farmers would not have enough water to irrigate their crops. Thus, during droughts, 
the level and volatility of prices rose. Although we focus on conflicts among farmers, not between 
farmers and Waterlords, we also study the effect of droughts on conflict. Libecap (2007) studies the 
conflict between farmers in Owens Valley and the city of Los Angeles, when the city bought the 
water rights from the farmers. The conflict deteriorated during the drought in the early 1920s. 
                                                                 
8This is not  to say that informal punishments are not important in our or other settings. We believ e th ey  are,  an d t hey are  t ypically 
complements to formal punishments. Thus, the existence of informal punishments would reinforce
 
our claims. 
9
Tan-Kim-Yong (1980) argues, however, that in Thailand, water thefts are treated as regular thefts. Thus, the lack of moral stigma does no t 
apply to all irrigation communities in general. 
10
In other settings, fines could depend on other observables. Sutawan (1980) argues that in Bali the closer is the subak (commun ity)  f rom 
the dam, the higher the fine. 
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Hansen, Libecap and Low (2011) argue that climate change is reducing the supply of water and 
increasing its volatility. The effects will be felt more strongly in agriculture. We argue that a better 
understanding of conflict management on irrigation communities may help solve these conflicts in 
the future. More generally, we contribute to the growing economics literature on climate and conflict 
(e.g. Miguel et al, 2004; Bai and Kung, 2011; Chaney, 2013; Dell et al, 2014). 
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on crime deterrence.  When law enforcement is 
imperfect, two types of errors can occur: an innocent person may be convicted (false positive); or a 
guilty person may be acquitted (false negative). In our empirical setting, imperfect law enforcement 
arises due to law incompleteness or incomplete contracts. The goal of the law is to maximize welfare. 
However, since it is not possible to account for all possible contingencies in each case, and because 
judges' own information is imperfect, judges have some leeway to interpret the law. For example, a 
judge could decide not to punish a guilty farmer. Therefore, in our setting, the judge faces a tradeoff 
between false positives and false negatives, rather than minimizing crime. 
In the classic economic analysis of criminal behavior started by Becker (1968), criminal histories 
are irrelevant and there is lack of progressivity. A large literature in the economic analysis of crime 
has empirically studied the responsiveness of crime to the severity of criminal sanctions.11 There is a 
number of papers documenting that offenders or prisoners who face harsher sanctions are less likely 
to reoffend or be rearrested in certain contexts, such as three strikes laws (e.g. Ziming, Hawkins and 
Kamin, 2001; Helland and Tabarrok, 2007), clemency bills (e.g. Drago, Galbiati and Vertova, 2009), 
and using discontinuities in punishment sentencing (e.g. Hjalmarsson, 2009b).12 These deterrence 
effects, however, do not hold universally (e.g. Hjalmarsson, 2009a; Lee and McCrary, 2017). Chalfin 
and McCrary (2017, Section 4) attribute this to differences in the responsiveness to sanctions among 
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See Cameron (1988), Marvell and Moody (1996), and Chalfin and McCrary (2017) for comprehensive reviews of the literature.
 
12
 Progressivity is also present in other setting, such as the “three strikes” policy in California. Punishment in these settings is t y p ically  
costly (e.g. overcrowded prisons). In our case punishment is costless.
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offenders of different ages.13 They emphasize that “[to] date, the degree to which offenders are 
deterred by harsher sanctions remains an open question” (Chalfin and McCrary 2017, p. 32). Our 
contribution to this literature is to study a setting where we follow individual offenders who, upon 
being detected committing a crime, face different sanctions for the same crime based on the offender's 
criminal history. We do this in a setting where offenders are caught with certainty, thus holding fixed 
the probability of being caught. The particularities in our empirical setting allow us to hold fixed the 
crime committed, and to study the roles of individual characteristics and punishment progressivity in 
the determination of crime.14 The crime consists of stealing water at a given time. The individual 
characteristic is whether the offender is wealthy, as captured by the Don honorific title. 
Progressiveness arises because the judges update their beliefs about the offenders' type based on their 
criminal record. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND DATA 
“Whiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over.” 
Mark Twain 
In this section, we describe the historical background, trial data, and the water auction. We 
combine data from different sources for our analysis. Trial and auction data, the primary sources of 
data for this study, are obtained from the historical archive of Mula.15  
2.1. Institutions in Mula 
The institutions for water allocation in Mula come from the Reconquista (Rodríguez Llopis, 
1998). After the conquest of the city, the Order of Santiago had absolute authority over Mula because 
                                                                 
13
 See Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2018) for a recent study about the effect of punishment severity on jury decision making using h ist or ical 
data from natural experiments in London that resulted in a decrease in punishment severity. 
14
 Our paper is also related to articles that focus on the economic factors related to crime, such as Machin and Meghir (2004), and Vick er s 
and Ziebarth (2016).
 
15
 From the section Heredamiento de Aguas, boxes No.: HA 167, HA 168, HA 169 and HA 170.
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the city was conquered by force.16 The Order of Santiago separated the ownership of land and water, 
creating a corporation, the Heredamiento de Aguas, to auction access to river water. The largest 
shareholder in Mula was the Marquis of Los Vélez. Under these new Christian institutions, the owners 
of the water property rights, who we call Waterlords, were different than the farmers, who owned 
land. In Mula, the Waterlords established a corporation which, despite the many political changes that 
occurred in Spain, lasted until 1966 (Espín-Sánchez, 2017). 
The Heredamiento de Aguas was divided into 832 dividend-paying shares. By contrast, all water 
owners had the same voting rights regardless of the number of shares they owned, i.e., the democratic 
rule was “one man, one vote.” After the corporation's bylaws changed in 1895, the new capitalistic 
rule allocated votes proportional to the number of shares. We do not observe a change in behavior 
after 1895. 
The water tribunals in Murcia and Mula were similar. In Murcia water was allocated using fixed 
quotas (tandas). In Mula water was allocated by a public auction (Donna and Espín-Sánchez, 2018a). 
We use the auction prices as an indicator of the value of the water stolen. While all Murcia farmers 
have water property rights, in Mula some farmers had no water rights, i.e., they had to purchase water 
in the auction. There were approximately 500 farmers in Mula. Whereas virtually all of them owned 
the land, only about 200 farmers also owned water rights. An individual needed to own water rights, 
i.e., own one of the 832 shares in the corporation, to be a member of the Heredamiento and to be a 
judge in Mula. Thus, judges may have responded to the demands of the water owners (Waterlords), 
but not necessarily to those of the farmers. In practice, however, the Waterlords who owned most of 
the water rights but did not themselves farm were never members of the tribunal. The members of the 
tribunal were instead farmers wealthy enough to own water rights. Any individual, regardless of 
water ownership, could sue or be sued at court. 
                                                                 
16
 Note that this initial shock in institutions is similar to that in Chaney and Hornbeck (2016).
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The water had to be bought in cash at the auction. Farmers in Mula did not have access to credit 
markets (see Donna and Espín-Sanchez, 2018b, for a thorough discussion about liquidity constraints 
in this setting). Failure to pay for the water meant the prohibition of buying water in the future, until 
the debt was paid. This strict rule did not apply to the fines or compensations after a trial. A 
defendant found guilty may take several weeks to pay the fine or the compensation, but would be 
allowed to buy water at the auction in the meantime. This suggests that the farmers and the tribunal 
saw water theft as a form of credit. On one hand, the probability of being caught after committing a 
crime was very high, according to the narratives in the trials. On the other, upon being caught, the 
farmer would have to pay the value of the water stolen plus a fine. These two circumstances, 
seemingly contradicting when there was an auction the weeks before the crime, are rationalized by 
the use of the option to steal water during a drought as an insurance of last resort by liquidity 
constrained farmers. This is consistent with the findings in Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018b). 
Seven elected water owners sat on the Mula tribunal. They were elected among the water-owners 
every year, on December 26th, and their appointment lasted for two years. In odd years, four members 
were elected; in even years three members were elected. Thus, in any given year there were three 
(four) members of the council in their first term and four (three) members in their second term. The 
voting was by secret ballot, writing the name of the candidate in a piece of paper. Every year, the 
tribunal members elected a president who appointed a vice-president and treasurer from the tribunal 
and a secretary, chosen from the general public. The tribunal resolved water disputes between 
farmers. Farmers could not appeal the tribunal's rulings to other courts. In the article, we call all the 
offenses “crimes.” These crimes, and the bylaws that regulated them, were recognized by customary 
law during the ancien régime. Later, they were added to the Spanish Civil Code in the 19th century. 
As mentioned by Garrido (2011a), there is heterogeneity in Spanish irrigation communities' 
monitoring and enforcement of crimes. In some communities, paid guards monitored water use, 
while in others, farmers took turns monitoring the canals. In many places, the watchman who caught 
a criminal kept a fraction of the fine, typically a half or a third. This incentive applied to both farmers 
13 
 
and paid guards. In Mula, farmers monitored water use before the bylaws of 1933, and professional 
guards after. We do not observe a change in farmers' behavior after 1933. 
2.2. Trial Data 
Figure 1 shows a trial, with the farmers as judges, and a map of the area under study. During the 
mid-19th century, following the French, local irrigation communities in Mediterranean Spain began to 
track information about their trials. The archive in Mula contains all trials spanning 1851 to 1948. 
Figure 2 displays a sample sentence, corresponding to a single trial, on August 12, 1906. Trial data 
consists of 282 trials over 97 years (approximately three trials per year). The defendant was found 
guilty in 174 trials, yielding approximately two guilty sentences per year. Admittedly, this is a 
relatively small number of trials. Note, however, that the data include all the trials in the archive over 
almost a century (97 years). The fact that there are few trials per year-relative to the total number of 
farmers who could potentially steal water during a given day-emphasizes our argument that the 
system deterred crime.17 Following Ostrom (1990), there were approximately 500 farmers at any 
given period of time in our case, with 40 auctions held every week, so the roughly 500 farmers would 
have had 26,000 (52 weeks per year 500 farmers) opportunities for theft, as contrasted with the two 
crimes per year, which means an infraction rate of 0.00008 (2/25,000 = 0.0000769), approximately 
100 times (0.008/0.00008) lower than that in Castellon considered extremely low by Ostrom (1990).18 
Mula is located in Southeastern Spain, one of the driest regions in Europe. Conflicts among farmers 
are common in this region, and their motivation is water, rather than land, rights, as the second quote 
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In the other 108 cases, nobody was brought before the judge. The typical case involved a farmer complaining that he/she did not r eceiv e 
enough water when irrigating. The guards would testify that, after inspecting the area, they foun d n o  f looded p lo t.  I n o th er  wo rds,  a  
complaint was filed but no charges were brought. In those cases, the defendant would be the guard o n  dut y  o n  t hat day ,  th e m anager  
responsible, or the whole Heredamiento. We recorded whether the guard or manager had a Don honorific title. 
18
 Ostrom (1990, p. 75) emphasizes: “There were approximately 1,000 [irrigators] in Castellon in the fifteenth century (T.F. Glick, personal 
communication). If the rotation system took about two weeks, each of the roughly 1,000 irrigators would have had about 25,000  
opportunities for theft occurred, as contrasted to 200 recorded instances of illegal taking of water. That would give a recorded infraction rate 
of 0.008.” 
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from Elinor Ostrom in the introduction emphasizes. Table 1 displays summary statistics for the 
variables in the dataset.19 Note that no auction was carried out in 101 out of the 282 weeks when a 
crime was reported. This is because there was not enough water in the dam during those weeks. The 
default fine for any violation was 25 pesetas.20 Judges could impose any fine between 0 and 25 
pesetas. This upper bound did not change during our sample period.21  
Trial information includes the offender's name, whether he/she was a Don, the plaintiff's name (a 
farmer or a guard) and whether he/she was a Don, the name of the judge (president of the council) 
and the verdict, the amount of the fine if any, the amount of the compensation (if any), and the date 
(of the trial and reported crime). When the water was stolen from a sub-canal directed to a farmer's 
plot, that farmer was the plaintiff and the victim, i.e., the farmer would receive the monetary 
compensation. When the water was stolen from the main canal, the guard was the plaintiff and the 
victim was the association, i.e., the association would receive the monetary compensation. 
Figure 3.A shows that the crimes with Don victims are more frequent during the summer months. 
This observation is consistent with farmers' strategic behaviors during the summer growing season. 
Farmers expected a lower punishment, and higher efficiency gains, if they stole from a wealthy 
farmer.  
2.3. Water Auctions Data 
Although the process of allocating water in Mula varied slightly over the years, the basic structure 
remained essentially unchanged from the 15th to the 20th century. Land in Mula was divided into 
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 We use nominal pesetas for all the results. Results using real pesetas with the deflator in Reher and Ballesteros (1993) are very  sim ilar,  
and are available upon request.  
20 The peseta was introduced in 1868. Before that, the payments were made in reales. 1 peseta is equivalent to 4 reales. For simplicity,  we 
transformed all the amounts to pesetas. 
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 In two instances, the judges imposed a fine greater than 25 pesetas. In the first one, a miller was found guilty of stealing water twice t he 
same week. The miller was fined with 50 pesetas. In the other, five men, all Don, were found guilty of a plot to block the main canal, and of 
cheating in the auction. One of them bid for several units in a row, then the others used this water for irrigation, which was fo rbidd en .  In 
this case, the average fine per farmer was 65 pesetas. 
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regadío (irrigated land) and secano (dry land). Irrigation was only permitted on the former type. A 
canal system allowed water from the river to reach all regadío lands.22 The fundamental reason for 
this division is that regadío were fertile lands that are close to rivers and, hence, allow a more 
efficient use of the region's scarce water. Only farmers who owned a piece of regadío land in Mula 
were allowed to buy water. For more details about the allocation mechanism see Donna and Espín-
Sánchez (2018a). 
Farmers bought water in a sequential English-auction. The auctioneer sold each of the units 
sequentially and independently of each other. They kept track of the name of the buyer of every unit 
and the price paid by the winner. The farmers could not store water in their plots or resell water. 
There was no auction in 101 of the weeks during which there was a trial. The dummy variable for 
whether there was an auction has an average of 0.64, and we have only 181 weeks of water prices. 
Farmers paid cash for their purchases. Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018b) show that liquidity 
constraints prevented farmers from buying water, even when their valuations were above the 
equilibrium price. A system of flexible fines partially mitigated imperfect insurance and credit 
markets, providing farmers with insurance of last resort. When a poor farmer's crops were at risk, 
they could steal water for irrigation and save their crop with a minimal punishment. Thus, the results 
here complement and reinforce the ones in Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018b). 
Figure 3.B shows the number of trials preceded by an auction in the week before. The number of 
trials where there was an auction the week before increases during the dry months in the summer. 
Note that this figure shows the trials where there was an auction the previous week. Thus, it is not a 
random sample. Typically, the probability of having auctions throughout the year is high, but it 
decreases substantially during the summer. Conditional on a crime, the probabilities are different. 
The high percentage of crimes when auctions were not held during the winter might seem puzzling 
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 The canal system was expanded from the 13
th
 to 15
th
 century, as a response to the greater  dem and fo r  land due t o  t h e in crease in  
population. The regadío land's structure has not change since the 15
th
 century.
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(e.g. December). Generally, in those wet months the number of crimes was low. However, if farmers 
could not buy water at auction, they might resort to stealing. 
2.4. Rain 
We complement the trial and auction data with daily rainfall data for Murcia, which we obtain 
from the Agencia Estatal de Metereología (AEMET), the National Meteorological Agency in Spain. 
Rainfall data from Mula is only available after 1933, while the rain data for Murcia goes back to 
1865. The two cities are only 35 kilometers apart, and they are located in the same valley.23 
Mediterranean climate rainfall occurs mainly during spring and fall. Peak water requirements for the 
products cultivated in the region are reached in spring and summer, between May and August. In 
addition to the auction dummy variable, and the price of water, we also use two additional variables 
that are correlated with farmers' need for water. The variable season is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the crime was committed during the months of May, June, July or August, and zero otherwise. 
The variable dry week is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there was no rain the week 
before the trial, and zero otherwise. 
 
3. MODEL AND PREDICTIONS 
In this section, we present the model, and describe its predictions and their fit to the data. We 
propose a model in which farmers are heterogeneous in two dimensions: water need and water 
greed.24 Both types are private information. The judge may observe public signals that are correlated 
with each of them, and may adjust punishment accordingly. We assume that the two types are 
independent, but the predictions are similar if we allow for correlation. Farmers' utility function is 
concave in water consumed. Farmers' greed type is only relevant when they steal water. Greedy 
farmers suffer less from the punishment. In the cases were a complaint was filed but no one was 
                                                                 
23
 The correlation of rain in the two cities is 0.82. The monthly average (standard deviation) rain is 257.7mm  an d 2 6 1.2mm ( 3 22.3 an d 
362.1) for Murcia and Mula, respectively.
 
24
 Alternatively, the first dimension measures whether the farmer is needy, while the second measures whether the farmer is greedy. 
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accused, the complaint stated only that the water flowing through the canal was “lower than 
expected,” but after a guard was called in and the canals inspected, there was no water missing. 
The farmers are rational and forward looking. They steal water whenever it is profitable, 
conditional on expected punishment. The judge is benevolent, rational, and forward looking. The 
optimal punishment depends on the information available to the judge, including public signals, 
farmers' individual characteristics, and farmers' criminal histories. We interpret each trial as a game 
between the farmer and the judge. The rain in the town the week before the crime occurred is a public 
signal observed by the judge. It is correlated with the idiosyncratic need of water of the farmer. Past 
behavior and certain characteristics of the farmers, such as whether they are a Don, are signals that 
are correlated with farmer’s greed. 
The judge always imposes the optimal punishment. It corresponds to the first best when it is 
feasible, and the second best when the first best is not feasible. A first best, or efficient, punishment 
system means that farmers steal water if, and only if, it is socially optimal. There are neither false 
positives nor false negatives. In this case, the optimal punishment does not depend on the public 
signal. The first best allocation might not be feasible, as we discuss below. Intuitively this is because 
the judge can implement the first best only when the farmers are relatively homogeneous in their 
greed, and relatively heterogeneous in their need. 
 3.1. Static Model 
To simplify the exposition, we assume that the probability of a farmer being caught is equal to 
one. This is consistent with the empirical record where only three times in one hundred years was a 
case reported, and no-one was accused.25 Farmer i has the following expected utility function: 
Ui (ri + w, θi, F (R)), 
where ri ∈{rL, rH} is the individual state of the farmer, i.e., the amount of rain he/she received in 
his/her plot and uses for irrigation, which can be high or low (rH > rL); w ∈ {0, W}, with W > 0, is the 
                                                                 
25
These cases are false claims according to the guards. A model with a probability of being caught less than one has similar predictions, but  
would make the algebra more cumbersome. Results are available upon request.  
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amount of water stolen by the farmer; θi ∈{θH, θL} is the type of the farmer (either not greedy, θi = θH , 
or greedy, θi = θL); R ∈ {H, L} is a public signal about the individual state, i.e., the amount of rain in 
the town, which can be high or low (H > L); F(R) ∈ {0, F} is the fine imposed to the farmer if caught 
stealing water, which is a continuous variable capped at F as prescribed in the bylaws of the 
Heredamiento and can depend on the public signal. The farmers’ type θi only affects the farmer's 
utility when he/she steals and is convicted.26 That is, the utility of two farmers that receive the same 
amount of rain and do not steal water is the same, regardless of their type. 
A farmer can steal from the main canal when no other farmer is irrigating in which case the 
whole community suffers. The most common case, however, happen when a farmer deviates the 
water from the main canal or a sub-canal when another farmer is irrigating, and effectively steals 
water from this farmer. Only farmer i observes ri. Rainfall, R, is a public signal; however, the way 
the farmer uses the water is not. The water used by the farmer would be highly correlated with the 
amount of rain in the town, but not perfectly. Some farmers, for example, have irregular land and 
they cannot take advantage of all the water they get. Alternatively, the farmer may not be able to go 
to the plot and plow the water the day of the rainfall due to a contingency, such as sickness. More 
generally, ri captures idiosyncratic component for farmer i of rainfall used for irrigation; ri is the 
usage of the observed rainfall, R. Both the judge and the farmer observe the public signal, R, which 
is correlated with the individual state, ri, as follows: 
Prob(ri = rL|R = RL) = qL, 
Prob(ri = rL|R = RH ) = qH. 
Note that, even when the judge observes the public signal, in equilibrium there would be false 
negatives and positives, i.e., guilty farmers will be set free and innocent farmers will be punished. 
Our model nests the following special cases: 
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We do not distinguish between the case where farmers suffer if they steal but are not caught (self-ashamed), from the o n e wh ere t hey 
suffer only if they are caught and convicted (social-ashamed). Cases where farmers stole water and they are not caught are not observed in 
the data and it  is not possible to distinguish self-ashamed from social ashamed cases. 
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• qH = qL = 1/2: in this case the signal is uninformative. This is the case where one does not take 
into account the possibility of public signals about the criminal type.  
• qH = 1 - qL = 0: in this case the signal reveals the type perfectly. This is an implicit assumption in 
Beckerian models, in which the trial will determine whether the defendant is guilty or not, 
without error. 
Let π ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that a farmer is not greedy, i.e., Prob(θi = θH) = π, which is 
common knowledge. Without loss of generality, let us normalize the most informative signal, RL; 
thus, qL ≥ qH. This is equivalent to say that it is more likely that the farmer receives low water when 
the rain in the town is low than when the water in the town is high. 
If a farmer does not steal water, her/his utility is: 
u(ri,. , 0). 
If a farmer steals an amount of water equal to w, her/his utility is: 
u(ri + W, θi, F(R)), 
where u(. ,. ,.) is the Bernoulli utility function. Note that, when a farmer does not steal water, her/his 
utility only depends on her/his private amount of water, ri. When a farmer steals water, however, in 
addition to her/his private amount of water ri, her/his utility also depends on her/his (greed) type, θi, 
and on the public signal, R, through the punishment received. We interpret θi in terms of the marginal 
returns derived from an additional unit of water stolen. In that sense, a higher θi is related to a better 
technology when stealing water. It could capture, for example, that the farmer has several workers 
(sons) who help her/him irrigate within a short period of time, or an idiosyncratic advantage due to 
the shape of the farmer's plot.27 
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 In one of the trials, the method to steal the water was particularly innovative. The defendant told three children to “swim” in th e canal 
that was next to his plot in such way that the canal was blocked. The water then overflowed the canal and spilled over the defendant's plot.
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We assume u(. ,. ,.) is strictly increasing and concave in its first term, strictly decreasing in its 
third term, and has a negative cross-derivative between the second and third term.28 
Example: 
Let u(ri + W, θi, F(R)) = (ri + W)
α - θiF(R), with α ∈ (0, 1). It is straightforward to 
verify that the assumptions hold. 
The Farmer's problem 
To make the problem relevant for the empirical application, we restrict attention to the 
parameters that would create incentives to steal water, and where it would be efficient for them to do 
so. In particular, we make the following assumption about the parameter space: 29 
Assumption A1: It is efficient that the farmer steals water if he/she received low rain: 
u(rL + W, θi, F(R)) - u(rL, θi, .) ≥ PR(W),  for all F(R), θi 
where PR(W) is the social value of W units of water when the public signal is R, i.e., PR = qR(u(rL + 
W) - u(rL))+ (1 - qR)(u(rH + W) - u(rH + W)). 
The public signal can be reinterpreted as the proportion (rather than the probability) of farmers 
who received low rain. Hence, the social value PR(W) equals the average utility that the amount of 
water, W, adds. The left-hand side in the previous equation represents the increase in utility that 
farmer i received when he/she steals W units of water. The right-hand side of the equation represents 
the expected increase in utility that a random farmer would have received had he/she used the water 
that was stolen. 
                                                                 
28 Formally the assumptions are: (a) u1(.,.,.) > 0: The farmer receives a positive utility from water, stolen or not; (b) u11(.,.,.) < 0: Water has 
diminishing marginal returns; (c) u2(.,.,.) ≤ 0: Greedy farmers suffer less from stealing than not greedy ones; (d) u2(.,.,0) = 0: I f  a  f arm er 
does not steal water, her/his utility is not affected by her/his (greedy) type; (e) u3(.,.,.) < 0: The farmer receives a negative utility from t he 
punishment; (f) u23(.,.,.) < 0: Greedy farmers suffer less from a given punishment than greedy ones. 
29
 See Di Tella and Dubra (2008) for a similar approach. In their model t he choice of becoming a criminal depends on a “meanness” shock , 
which is used to establish the severity of punishment. 
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Example : 
Let u(ri + W, θi, F(R)) = (ri + W)
α - θiF(R), with α ∈ (0, 1), rL = 0, and W ≈ 0. Then, 
u(rL,θi, .) = 0 and u11(.,.,.) < 0, and both assumptions are satisfied. Moreover, this 
decision is socially efficient. 
The timing of the game is as follows. First, nature draws {ri, R}; the farmer observes {ri, R}. 
Second, the farmer chooses whether to steal, i.e., w ∈ {0, W}. Third, if the farmer stole water, the 
judge observes R and chooses a policy function F(R). Fourth, payoffs are given. If the farmer does 
not steal, he/she cannot be caught; her/his utility is u(ri, ., 0). If the farmer chooses to steal, i.e., w = 
W, he/she is caught and her/his utility is u(ri + W, θi, F(R)). 
Thus, the farmer steals if, and only if: 
u(ri + W, θi, F(R)) ≥ u(ri, ., 0).  
If the judge were to observe θi, the judge could choose F(R) so that the farmer finds it profitable 
to steal water if ri = rL, and does not steal water if ri = rH. This is the first best outcome, and is a 
consequence of the concavity of the utility function with respect to water. However, the judge does 
not know θi. Thus, in general, the first best outcome is not attainable. 
Prediction P0: A farmer is more likely to steal water when her/his need for water is 
high. 
The lower the water level in the farmer's plot, the higher the farmer's marginal utility of additional 
water and, thus, the more likely that he/she will steal water. The judge can impose a punishment that 
achieves the first best when the differences in utility due to the water need are larger than the 
differences in utility due to water greed. If the first best is not feasible, then the judge decides 
between two second best punishment systems for each realization of the public signal. The two 
possible optimal punishments are: 
• Harsh punishment: the only farmers who steal water are greedy farmers who need water. 
This system is not efficient because not greedy farmers, who need water, do not steal water. 
In other words, there is “too little stealing,” due to false positives. 
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• Mild punishment: all farmers, except the not greedy farmers who do not need water, steal. 
This system is not efficient because greedy farmers, who do not need water, steal. In other 
words, there is “too much stealing,” due to false negatives. 
For a given amount of rain, there could not be simultaneously false positives and false negatives. 
In practice, however, it is likely for the judge to impose a harsh punishment in a particular week 
when the signal (rain) is high, and a mild punishment in different week when the signal (rain) is low. 
That is, the punishment would be larger when it rained the week before the water was stolen. In 
general, the judge is more likely to impose a harsh punishment when: (i) the public signal is highly 
correlated with the water needs of the farmers; and (ii) many farmers are greedy. 
The intuition behind the second best punishment system is the following. Farmers in need (i.e. 
farmers who are desperate) are more likely to steal water, which is efficient. However, greedy farmers 
are also more likely to steal water, which need not be efficient. An intermediate punishment can 
always induce needy, greedy farmers to steal water and not needy, not greedy farmers not to steal it.  
Both scenarios are efficient. Whether the punishment can achieve the first best depends on whether 
needy, not greedy farmers are more likely to steal water than not needy, greedy farmers. Intuitively, 
when greed does not matter, and has little impact on the decision to steal, needy farmers (greedy or 
not) are more likely to steal than not needy farmers (greedy or not). In that case, there is always an 
intermediate punishment that “separates” needy from not needy farmers. However, when greed  does 
have a large impact on the decision to steal, not needy, greedy farmers would be more likely to steal 
than needy, not greedy farmers under any punishment system. In that case, there is no punishment 
system that would “separate” these farmers (not needy, greedy from needy, not greedy). The optimal 
punishment in this case would be second best, and it consists of either punishing all the farmers in 
this pool (harsh), or none of them (mild). 
In the next section, we relate these predictions to the empirical regularities in our setting. 
Predictions P1, P2, and P3 relate to the information available for the judge. They show that we need 
two dimensions of private characteristics to explain the empirical regularity that punishments are 
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rarely maximal and depend on the information available to the judge. Taken together with the 
empirical analysis below, these predictions suggest that we are in a second-best environment. 
Predictions P4, P5, and P6 provide specific predictions regarding the characteristics of the crime, the 
victim, and the criminal's history, respectively. 
The Judge's Problem 
The judge's objective is to achieve social efficiency. The judge wants to punish the farmer if 
he/she steals water when ri = rH, and not to punish her/him when ri = rL. But the judge does not 
observe the individual state of the farmer, ri. Instead, the judge only observes a signal, R, which is 
positively, but not perfectly, correlated with the rainfall in the farmer's plot, ri.
30 Although we are 
interested in the more realistic case where greed is not fully observable and the public signal is 
imperfectly correlated with the individual state of water available to farmer i, we show as benchmarks 
the cases where either the greed type θi or the water need type ri is observable. The benchmarks 
highlight why we need a model with two dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity to obtain testable 
predictions in our setting. 
We allow the judge to observe a noisy signal about the water needs, but not about the greed of the 
farmer. This is for the following three reasons. First, we do not have data regarding the greed of the 
farmers, thus we cannot test the predictions of such an extension. Second, although the judge does not 
observe a direct signal related to the greed of the farmer, he/she observes an indirect signal in the 
dynamic game. Greed is a permanent state, while water needs are not. Therefore, a recidivist is more 
likely to be greedy than a first-time offender. Recidivism can then be interpreted as an indirect greed 
signal. We explore this in the next subsection, when we introduce dynamics. Finally, the model 
would be more complicated to solve, but the intuition regarding the signal about would be similar. 
Greed is perfectly observable . In this case the judge does not observe the water available to the 
farmer, ri, but the judge observes the greed type of the farmer. Thus, the farmer can condition the 
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If we consider the case with asymmetric farmers, with characteristics observed by the judge, the public signal is still a sufficient statistic  
for all relevant information observable by the judge.
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punishment both in the greedy type the farmer, ri, and the public signal, R. The judge chooses the 
punishment so that only a farmer in need of water, i.e., ri = rL, would find it profitable to steal. The 
optimal punishment satisfies: 
u(rL + W, θi, F(R, θi)) ≥ u(rL, ., 0), 
u(rH + W, θi, F(R, θi)) < u(rH, ., 0). 
Now assume that the judge would like to choose the minimum punishment, F(R, θi), that satisfies 
this condition, for example, because farmers are poor. Then, F(R, θi) solves u(rL + W, θi, F(R, θi)) = 
u(rL, θi, 0). Since u(., ., .) is concave in its first argument, a sufficient condition for such a punishment 
to exist is that u(., ., .) is linear in its third argument, i.e., that utility is quasi-linear on the fine. 
Example: 
Let u(ri + W, θi, F(R, θi)) = (ri + W)
α - θiF(R) 
Then, the optimal punishment is: 
F(R, θi) = min {F, (1/θi)((rL + W)/rL)
α}. 
The punishment does not depend on the public signal because the judge can separate between 
greed types, by imposing different punishments. The optimal punishment is increasing in the amount 
of water stolen, W; decreasing in θi, and decreasing in the amount of rain received by the farmer in the 
bad state, rL. The last result says that punishment is lower when the farmer needs less water, i.e., 
when the gains from stealing water are smaller. This is because, if rL is sufficiently low relative to rH, 
it is optimal that the farmer steals water. But the gains of stealing water are smaller when rL are 
greater. Thus, the judge imposes a smaller punishment. Note that if greed is irrelevant, i.e., θL = θH, 
then the same results apply. In that case, the optimal punishment would always be the same. In the 
example above the optimal punishment would be F(R, θi) = (1/θi)((rL + W)/rL)
α.  
Prediction P1: If greed is perfectly observable, then the optimal punishment is 
independent of the public signal and positive. 
In the data, we observe that the punishment varies as a function of the previous week's rainfall, 
which means that the judge cannot perfectly observe greed, but that he/she is concerned about it. 
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Need type is perfectly observable. In this case, the judge knows the rain in the farmer's plot, but not 
whether the farmer is greedy. Thus, the judge can condition the fine on the individual state, that is, 
F(R) = F(ri). This is equivalent to having a perfectly correlated public signal: qL = qH = 1. The judge 
allows farmers to steal when ri = rL, but not when ri = rH. The first result holds if u(rL + W, θi, F(rL)) 
≥ u(rL, θi, 0), for all θi. To obtain the latter, the judge imposes a fine sufficiently high, F(rH) = F. In 
general, efficiency is not guaranteed. Following the intuition before, the judge can impose the 
minimum punishment possible when the state is low, i.e., F(rL) = 0, and the maximum punishment 
available with the state is high, i.e., F(rH) = F. However, if F is sufficiently small, then a farmer with 
ri = rH would find it optimal to steal water in the high state, and in that case, the farmer will always 
steal water, regardless of the punishment implemented by the judge. In our empirical setting the 
judges never impose the maximum punishment for the first offense. That means that the case where 
the maximum punishment is very low is not relevant empirically. 
Example (continued): 
The inequality above implies (rL + W)
α  - θiF(rL) ≥ (rL), for all θi. A greedy farmer has less 
disutility from stealing water, thus it is only necessary to check that the inequality holds for 
greedy farmers, i.e., (rL + W)
α - θLF(rL) > (rL + W)
α - θiF(rL) ≥ (rL)
α. The optimal punishment 
satisfies F(RL) ≤ (1/θH)((rL + W)/rL)
α. Any punishment that satisfies this condition would 
deter crime. In practice, and given that the judge knows that the farmer needs the water, it is 
likely that the chosen punishment would be the minimum available, i.e., F(rL) = 0.
 
The predictions are different from the previous case. If rain is high, punishment is maximum and 
nobody steals in equilibrium. If rain is low, punishment depends on the rain received in the bad state. 
Optimal punishment is increasing in the amount of water stolen, W; decreasing in the greed of the 
greediest farmer θH; and decreasing in the amount of rain received by the farmer in the bad state, rL. 
Prediction P2: If water needs are perfectly observable, then the optimal punishment is 
maximal when the signal is high and minimal when the signal is low, i.e., F(rH ) = F 
and F(rL) = 0. 
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In the data, we observe that the punishment is usually low. If the punishment varies with the public 
signal, it does not reach a maximum even after a heavy rain. The data shows that the punishment 
varied with individual characteristics which, together with predictions P1 and P2, imply that the 
judge observed imperfect signals correlated with each dimension. We believe that both types are 
private information and that both shocks are idiosyncratic or, equivalently, the judge does not 
perfectly observe the shocks. Judges had good information about how greedy were each farmer, but 
the information is not perfect. Even if the rainfall is the same for the plots of all farmers, they have 
plots of different sizes. However, they buy units of water of the same size, which means that they 
have different levels of moisture in their plots in any given week. The judge does not perfectly 
observe the moisture level in a farmer's plot. 
To rationalize predictions P1 and P2 we need at least two dimensions of heterogeneity. The 
following predictions relate to the two-dimensional model that we propose. 
Greed and need types are unobservable. Now the judge only observes the public signal about the 
rain in the town, R, neither the farmer's type, θi, nor the farmer's individual rain, ri. Thus, the judge 
can only condition the fine on the public signal, F(R). Given R, the farmer is not greedy with 
probability π. Depending on the parameters, the judge may impose a fine such that all farmers steal 
for all realizations of R, no farmer steals for any realization of R, or, more interestingly, farmers steal 
when R = L, and they do not steal when R = H. We focus on the latter case. In the discussion that 
follows it is useful to simplify the notation as follows. Define the gains from stealing water for type 
(ri, θj) as Δ(ri, θj) ≡ u(ri + W, θj, F(R)) - u(ri, θj; 0). 
In general, an efficient punishment deters not needy types, rH, from stealing and encourages 
needy types, rL, to steal. Thus, an efficient punishment satisfies the following inequalities, depending 
on the four realizations of the two types: 
• Greedy and not needy:    Δ(rH, θL) < 0, i.e., u(rH + W, θL, F(R)) < u (rH, θL, 0). 
• Greedy and needy:          Δ(rL, θL) ≥ 0, i.e., u(rL + W, θL, F(R)) ≥ u(rL, θL, 0). 
• Not greedy and needy:    Δ(rH, θH) < 0, i.e., u(rL + W, θH, F(R)) <  u(rL, θH, 0). 
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• Not greedy and needy:    Δ(rL, θH) ≥ 0, i.e., u(rL + W, θH, F(R)) ≥ u(rL, θH, 0). 
Depending on whether the greed effect is important, the judge could apply an optimal 
punishment. If greed has a small effect on the utility of the farmers, the judge would be able to 
implement the efficient punishment. However, if greed affects the utility of the farmers more than 
their individual state, then the optimal punishment would not be efficient. We formalize this with the 
following assumption. 
Assumption A2: The parameters are such that the following relation holds for any punishment 
F(R):  Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rL, θL). 
Assumption A2 implies that a farmer who is needy but not greedy benefits more from stealing 
water than one who is greedy but not needy. In other words, the need of water effect is stronger than 
the greed effect for the decision to steal water. When assumption A2 holds, the differences in utility 
from stealing water are ranked as follows:  
Δ(rL, θL) > Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rH, θL) > Δ(rH, θH), 
where the first and the third inequality follow from the fact that greed types suffer more from the 
stealing, and the second inequality comes from A2. In this case, and using that the function is 
monotonically decreasing in F(R), it is straightforward to see that an optimal punishment exist that 
can “separate” the needy from the not needy farmers. Such punishment would be high enough to 
make needy farmers steal water, and not needy farmers not steal so that in equilibrium: 
Δ(rL, θL) > Δ(rL, θH) > 0 > Δ(rH, θL) > Δ(rH, θH).  (1) 
In this case, the optimal punishment does not depend on the public signal, and the first best can be 
achieved with a fixed punishment. When A2 does not hold however, the rank between the differences 
in utility from stealing water is as follows: 
Δ(rL, θL) > Δ(rH, θL) > Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rH, θH), 
Note that now no punishment can “separate” the needy from the not needy farmers. However, we 
can still characterize the second-best punishment, for each signal realization. Using again the 
monotonicity of punishment it is easy to see that there are two second best punishments that could be 
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applied here. The first (mild) punishment allows stealing water to all types except (rH, θH). This can 
be achieved with a low punishment. The second (harsh) punishment allows stealing water only to 
farmers of type (rL, θL). In equilibrium, these second-best punishments imply: 
Mild Δ(rL, θL) > Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rH, θL) > 0 > Δ(rH, θH).  (2) 
Harsh Δ(rL, θL) > 0  > Δ(rL, θH) > Δ(rH, θL) > Δ(rH, θH).  (3)  
One can see that when the public signal is not informative, i.e., qL ≈ qH, the optimal punishment 
would be either always Mild or always Harsh. However, when the public signal is informative, i.e., qL 
>> qH, the optimal punishment would typically imply a Mild punishment when the signal is low, i.e., 
R = L, and a Harsh punishment when the signal is high, i.e., R = H. The intuition is straightforward. 
In any optimal punishment system and under any signal, needy and greedy (rL, θL) types always steal 
water and not needy and not greedy (rH, θH) types never steal water, both of which are efficient. The 
inefficiency arises because the judge cannot distinguish not needy and greedy (rH, θL) from needy and 
not greedy (rL, θH) types, with the punishment. The judge would like the former to steal water, but not 
the latter. However, these two types are pooled together. When the signal is low, a high fraction of the 
farmers in the pool are needy and not greedy (rL, θH) type. Thus, it is optimal for the judge to allow 
everyone in the pool to steal water. When the signal is high, a small fraction of the farmers in the pool 
are needy and not greedy (rL, θH) type. So, it is optimal for the judge to allow no one in the pool to 
steal water. 
“High” and “Low” fractions here are relative. The actual threshold depends on the preferences of 
the judge, and the number of farmers of each type, conditional on the signal. For example, the judge 
objective function could be uniformly utilitarian. In that case, he/she wants to allow the farmers in 
the pool if there are more than 50 percent of needy and not greedy types. Then, it could be that qL > 
qH > 0.5, and the judge wants to always implement the Mild punishment, for both signals. 
Alternatively, if 0.5 > qL > qH, then the judge always wants to implement the Harsh punishment. The 
more interesting and realistic case happens when qL > 0.5 > qH. In that case, the judge implements 
the Mild punishment when the signal is low, and the harsh punishment when the signal is high, i.e., 
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F(L) < F(H). The optimal punishment would depend on the fraction of farmers who are not greedy, 
π. When π is small, most farmers in the pool would be greedy, and the judge would impose a harsher 
punishment. 
Example (continued): 
Using the middle inequalities in equation (1) we obtain:  
((rL - W)
α - (rL)
α)/θH ≥ F(R) ≥ ((rH - W)
α - (rH)
α)/θL. 
This condition holds when the difference between rL and rH is large; when the amount 
of water stolen, W, is high; or when the greed are types similar, θH ≈ θL. 
 Example (continued): 
If the judge imposes a high fine, F(R) > ((rH - W)
α - (rH)
α)/θL, both types will not steal when 
ri = rH. This is optimal. However, greedy farmers steal when ri = rL if ((rL - W)
α - (rL)
α)/θH  ≥ 
F(R). The outcome is inefficient only when the farmer is needy but not greedy, θi = θH and ri 
= rL, which happens with probability qRπ when the public signal is R. The fine is F(R) = ((rL 
- W)α - (rL)
α)/θL. If this condition does not hold, the fine is deterring all farmers from stealing 
always. This is not what we observe in the data, where fines are low and there is some 
crime. If the judge imposes a low fine, F(R) ≤ ((rL - W)
α - (rL)
α)/θH, both types steal when ri 
= rL. This is also optimal. The greedy types steal when ri = rH if F(R) ≤ ((rH - W)
α - (rH)
α)/θL.  
The outcome is inefficient only when the farmer is greedy and receives high rain, θi = θH 
and ri = rH, which happens with probability (1- qR)(1- π) when the public signal is R. The 
fine is now F(R) = ((rL - W)
α - (rL)
α)/θH. 
Prediction P3: If both greed and water need are unobservable, and we can separate not 
needy, greedy from needy, not greedy farmers, then the first best is feasible and the 
optimal punishment does not depend on the public signal. 
There are two implications from P3. First, it complements P1 in that even if greed is 
unobservable, first best punishment may still be independent of the public signal. In the data, we 
observe that punishment varies as a function of rainfall during the previous week. This means that we 
30 
 
are in the second-best scenario. Second, P3 formalizes the intuition above that punishment is efficient 
if, and only if, we can separate not needy, greedy from needy, not greedy farmers. This occurs when 
not needy, greedy farmers are more sensitive to punishment than needy, not greedy ones. 
Prediction P4: If both greed and water needs are unobservable, and the first best is 
unfeasible, then the optimal punishment requires a mild punishment when the signal 
is low and a harsh punishment when the signal is high. 
The analysis for the judge's behavior above is related to the characteristics of the crime and of the 
criminal. However, the efficiency of the system also depends on the characteristics of the victim. 
Assumption A1 means that it is efficient for a farmer that received low rain, rL, to steal water from an 
“average” farmer. A direct consequence is that it is also efficient for a farmer to steal water from a 
farmer that received high rain, rH. Due to the concavity of the utility function on water, the marginal 
utility of water is highest for a farmer that received rL, is lowest for a farmer that received rH, and it is 
intermediate for the average farmer. Thus, A1 implies that it is also efficient to steal water from 
farmer that received high rain, i.e., u(rL + W, θi, F(R)) - u(rL, θi,.) ≥ PR
H(W) ≡ u(rH + W) - u(rH). 
Moreover, following the same logic, the gain in efficiency when a farmer that received low rain rL 
steals water would be greater when the victim is a farmer that received high rain. Finally, the lower 
the probability qR that the victim received low rain rL, the higher the efficiency gains from stealing, 
and the less likely is that judge would impose a harsh punishment. The intuition is the same as above. 
Before, when deciding between a harsh and a mild punishment the judge takes into account the 
probability that the defendant received low or high rain, i.e., the higher the probability that the 
defendant received low rain, the lower the punishment. Now, when deciding between a harsh and a 
mild punishment, the judge considers the probability that the victim received low or high rain, i.e., 
the higher the probability that the victim received high rain, the lower the punishment.  
Prediction P4 indicates the sign of the effect of the public signal on the punishment. The 
predictions of the static model refer to water need. These predictions also hold for any specific trial's 
observable characteristics, including the victim's individual characteristics, which convey the victim's 
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water need. In our model, it is efficient for a farmer whose land received little rain, to steal water 
from a farmer whose land received heavy rain. This observation is summarized in prediction P5 
below. 
Prediction P5: If both greed and water need are unobservable, and the first best is 
unfeasible, then the optimal punishment requires a mild punishment when the victim 
received heavy rain and a harsh punishment when the victim received light rain. 
In the next subsection, we discuss additional dynamic predictions. In our model, water needs are 
independent across periods, while greed is persistent across periods. This means that while all the 
predictions in the static case address the relative likelihood of water greed vs. water need, dynamic 
predictions address directly the likelihood that the farmer is greedy. That is, a recidivist is more likely 
to be greedy. 
In the data, there is heterogeneity on the punishment for first time offenders, which is a direct 
consequence of the judge having some partial knowledge of individual characteristics. A farmer, who 
confessed the crime would get a very low fine of less than five pesetas, usually followed by an 
admonition of the judge that he/she understood that the farmer was in dire necessity, but that the 
punishment will be harsher if he/she did it again: 
“After the board learned about the excuses claimed by the defendants, they agreed to 
impose a fine of two pesetas, to each of them, because it was the first time  that they 
incurred in such a misdemeanor, warning them that if they recidivate in the future, the 
fine would be larger.” Obtained from authors' translation of the trial on August 12, 
1906, displayed in Figure 2 (bolds are ours).31 
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 Note that the judge emphasizes, as shown in Figure 2, at the time of the first-time offense, that recidivists will be punished more harshly.  
Such statements were common in judges’ sentences. We interpret them as validating the punishment progressivity of the system,  ev en  in  
cases where the counterfactual recidivism did not materialize (i.e. unobserved in the data). 
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This motivates the main prediction of the dynamic model: that recidivists are more likely to be 
greedy than first time offenders. 
3.2. Dynamic Predictions 
The main prediction of the dynamic model is that recidivists are more likely to be greedy than 
first time offenders. This is because the greed type is permanent, while the need type is not. In our 
model, we assume that the needy type is independent across periods. The main insight is that 
differences in water needs are “washed away” after a heavy rain, while differences in greed are not. 
In general, it is not possible to narrow the predictions without knowing the punishment system. The 
following prediction holds, however, under any optimal punishment system. 
Prediction P6: A recidivist farmer is more likely to be greedy than a first-time offender. 
Thus, the farmer is more likely to receive a harsh punishment. 
Predictions P4 and P6 imply that the judge takes observable characteristics into account when 
deciding the punishment. This is because these characteristics are correlated with the probability that 
a farmer is greedy. Thus, farmers who are more likely to be greedy are punished more harshly. 
Because first time offenders are not likely to be greedy, they would not receive a harsh punishment. 
In the trials, judges knew who recidivists were. Thus, they imposed them the maximum punishment, 
and mentioned this in the sentences (see, e.g., Figure 2). In our data, there is only one occasion where 
a farmer stole a third time. This is consistent with our model where stealing a third time is unlikely. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we perform the empirical analysis. The results are consistent with the predictions 
from our model, in which judges maximize efficiency under limited information. Judges use the 
available information regarding the crime, the victim, the criminal, and the criminal's history to 
impose the appropriate punishment. For details about the predictions of the model see the appendix.  
Crime Rates 
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Our model produces specific predictions about how observable characteristics are correlated with 
committing a crime. Table 2 presents marginal effects from probit regressions of the farmer being 
“guilty” on several covariates. The dependent variable, guilty, is a dummy variable identifying 
whether the farmer was found guilty. The covariates include a seasonal dummy, an indicator for the 
honorific title of the victim and defendant, and a dummy variable indicating whether there was an 
auction during the previous week. Wealthy (poor) farmers (do not) have a Don honorific title. Table 2 
column 1 shows that on average, poor farmers are not more likely to be found guilty than wealthy 
farmers. This finding is consistent with the results in Vickers and Ziebarth (2016), which analyze 
Victorian London crime data, and also found that higher status individuals received a harsher 
punishment for the same offense. 
Column 2 shows that poor farmers are less likely to be found guilty during wet months, and more 
likely to be found guilty during dry months. These findings are consistent with poor farmers being 
needy (they steal water during the dry season), and wealthy farmers being greedy (they steal water 
during the wet season). Columns 3 and 4 show that the pattern does not change when we interact the 
variables with the characteristics of the victim. Columns 5-8 show that the results are robust to 
including the auction and dry month dummy variables. The auction dummy variable is positive, but 
not statistically significant. It suggests that farmers are more likely to be found guilty if they had the 
chance to buy water at the auction, although the coefficient is not precisely estimated. The dry month 
dummy variable shows that water scarcity significantly increases the likelihood of being guilty, 
consistent with prediction P0.32 Farmers are more likely to be in need of, and to steal, water during a 
dry month. 
Fines 
We now discuss the empirical results regarding punishment, and how they relate to the 
predictions from our model. The predictions are reflected in the fines imposed by the judge, as a 
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 Water prices are highly correlated with rain. Due to this collinearity, when both coefficients are included, neither is statistically 
significant. The null hypothesis that both are zero is rejected.
 
34 
 
function of the type of the crime and characteristics of the criminal. Table 3 presents the results from 
OLS regressions of fines on several covariates. 
Fines are significantly lower when the defendant is not a Don (i.e., poor farmer).  The 5.35 
pesetas in column 1 shows that poor farmers receive a lower punishment for the same crime. Wealthy 
farmers are less likely to be in need of water. They usually have higher levels of moisture in their 
plots, because they irrigate more often (Donna and Espín-Sánchez, 2018b). Thus, their marginal 
utility of water is lower, the damage of their crime is larger, and the damage (or marginal disutility) of 
stealing from them is lower. The judges respond by inflicting lower (higher) fines when the defendant 
is not (is) a Don, consistent with prediction P4. Our analysis implicitly assumes that social 
punishments are the same for everyone. However, it could be that wealthy farmers suffer higher 
social punishments than do poor farmers. If that were the case, we would underestimate the true value 
of the coefficient on column 1, i.e., the true effect would be even larger. 
As regards individual farmer's characteristics, fines are significantly lower when the victim is 
wealthy, 4.53 pesetas lower in column 2. The judges respond by inflicting lower fines in cases where 
the damage is lower (column 3), consistent with prediction P5. Consistent with prediction P6, 
recidivists are punished more harshly. Their fines are over 15 pesetas higher than for first time 
offenders convicted of the same crime. That is, recidivists are punished with fines more than three 
times higher than the average. All recidivists receive fines of 20-25 pesetas, the maximum allowed in 
the bylaws. The weekly wage of a laborer was approximately 25 pesetas during the period under 
analysis. 
Columns 5-8 show that the results in columns 1-4 are robust to including the auction and the dry 
month dummy variables. Fines for crimes reported in weeks during which no auctions were run are 
significantly lower, 4.61 pesetas in column 5.33 A farmer, who stole water in a week when there was 
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 In unreported results, we also find that punishments are significantly lower for water stolen from the main canal relative to water st o len  
from other farmers. This means that the judges consider a crime to be more severe when stealing from other farmer-who is not a Do n- than 
stealing from the main canal. This is consistent with judges minimizing conflict among farmers.
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an auction, could have bought the water at the auction, unless he/she was liquidity constrained. This 
means that the farmer who stole water in a week with an auction was more likely to be liquidity 
constrained. Judges were more lenient in those cases. 
There is no correlation between seasonality and fines. There are two effects at play. During a 
drought, the need for water is higher and, thus, the judge imposes a lower fine. However, imposing a 
lower fine would also make farmers who do not need water more likely to steal. The former (direct) 
effect makes fines lower, while the later (indirect) effect makes fine larger. The results in Table 3 
suggest that the indirect effect partially offsets the direct effect. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that the fines are lower when the victim is wealthy. Table 4 
indicates that the amount of water stolen, and thus the compensation, is higher when the victim is 
wealthy. These results are consistent with our model. They may also be consistent with the following 
hypothesis. The judge is concerned about the total amount of the monetary punishment, fine plus 
compensation. In that case, the lower fines when the victim is wealthy may be a spurious correlation 
due to higher compensation paid when the victim is wealthy, and the negative correlation between 
compensations and fines. This hypothesis predicts a negative correlation between fine and 
compensation. It also predicts that adding compensation as a regressor in Table 3 would have a 
negative coefficient that is statistically different from zero. However, the correlation between fine 
and compensation is zero. Including compensation as a regressor in Table 3 produces a coefficient 
that is not statistically different from zero, and does not change the magnitude, sign, or statistical 
significance of the other coefficients. 
Compensation 
Fines have a punitive goal, to deter farmers from stealing. The revenue generated by the fines 
goes to the community. The goal of the compensation is to repair the damage inflicted to the victim 
of the crime: a particular farmer, if water was stolen from him/her; or the community, if water was 
stolen from the main canal. Thus, the amount of the compensation is an estimate of the value of the 
water stolen. The sentences in the trials state clearly that the amount for each of these concepts. The 
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judge separately mentions the fine and the compensation. In a typical case where a farmer steals 
water from another farmer, the money from the fine goes to the Heredamiento, whereas the money 
from the compensation goes to the victim. The amount of the compensation is always equal to the 
value of the water stolen, and the judge has no discretion over it. Therefore, one should interpret the 
results in Table 4 as characteristics of the crime. 
The effect of offenders' individual characteristics on the amount of compensation is consistent 
with the model and the results in Table 3. The compensation is not affected by the characteristics of 
the defendant, only by the characteristics of the victim. Table 4, column 1, shows that the amount of 
compensation is not statistically different when the defendant does not have a Don honorific title. 
Compensation is also not affected when the defendant is a recidivist, as shown in column 4. The 
amount of water stolen is not correlated with the defendant's observable characteristics. This finding 
is consistent with compensation being equal to damage inflicted rather than a punishment based on 
the crime. However, when the defendant is poor and the victim is wealthy, the compensation is about 
25 pesetas higher (column 3). Table 2 shows that a crime is more likely to occur during a dry month. 
However, the compensation is not affected by the dryness of the month. 
The amount of the compensation is highly correlated with the victim's characteristics.  The 
compensation is significantly higher when the victim has a Don honorific tittle (24.99 pesetas in 
column 2). Table 1 shows that the average compensation is 11.07 pesetas. This means that, when the 
victim is wealthy, the compensation is more than twice the average compensation. Again, one should 
not interpret this as Dons being forced to pay larger compensations. Compensations represent the 
estimated value of the water stolen, and the judge has no discretion over that amount. We interpret 
this correlation as characteristic of the crime. That is, when farmers steal from a wealthy farmer, they 
tend to steal about 25 pesetas more in terms of the value of the water, than when they steal from a 
poor farmer. This result suggests that when given the chance, farmers steal as much water as they can 
from a wealthy farmer. This is not true when stealing from poor farmers, however. This disparity 
could result from farmers' restraint from stealing too much water from poor farmers, or from wealthy 
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farmers' larger plots, which require more water. This result reinforces the ones in Table 3, where fines 
are lower for poor defendants and wealthy victims (column 3). The poor farmer pays a lower fine 
when stealing from a wealthy one, and the lower fine is for a crime involving a more valuable bounty. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We investigate the roles of individual characteristics and punishment progressivity in the 
determination of crime and welfare using a novel dataset of trials from a self-governed community of 
farmers. The system analyzed combined protection of water and land property rights, with a 
punishment system that minimized crime while creating insurance of last resort. We believe that the 
results here apply to other irrigation communities. The results help explain the role that punishment 
played in the survival of self-governed irrigation communities more generally. 
Punishment progressivity and information about individual characteristics are usually absent in 
criminology analysis of self-governed communities. We studied a particular historical setting, where 
judges impose low punishments for first time offenders based on individual characteristics, and 
recidivists are punished harsher than first time offenders. We showed that this punishment system is 
efficient in a model with a transitory individual state related to the need of stealing, and a persistent 
individual state related to the propensity of stealing, or greed. Because water was allocated using an 
auction, in the absence of frictions the allocation would be efficient. In the presence of frictions, we 
show that the system of punishment partially alleviated the inefficiency created by them. We 
reconciled the Beckerian insight that harsh punishments deter crime with the documented light 
punishments and low crime rates in self-governed irrigation communities. Average punishments are 
low because they are a weighted average of several small punishments for first time offenders, and a 
few large punishments for recidivists. Crime rates are low because the punishments for recidivists are 
harsh. This is a result from the particularities in our empirical setting. Due to volatile weather, the 
probability that a poor farmer is in need to steal water is high in the future. Losing the option value to 
steal in the future acts as a harsh punishment, thus deterring crime. 
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We showed that in our context, a positive amount of crime is socially efficient. It is optimal for 
farmers who are liquidity constrained and in need of water, to steal water from a neighbor, thus 
preventing their own trees from dying. However, whether a farmer is in need of water is not perfectly 
observable by the judge. Therefore, the judges trade off false positives and negatives, resulting in 
punishments that are neither maximal nor zero. Our empirical analysis showed that the judges in 
Mula trade off crime deterrence and water insurance. They made efficient use of information 
regarding the crime, the criminal, and the victim, to determine the optimal punishment. In our 
framework, legal flexibility allows judges to use their “judgment” and the information available to 
determine the punishment in each case. Judges used this flexibility to provide insurance of last resort 
to farmers, in a context of imperfect financial markets. 
One important insight from our paper is that low punishments, typically viewed as evidence of 
suboptimal contracts, were intended to increase efficiency, not equality. The disadvantageous 
treatment of wealthy farmers arises as a consequence of efficiency: their marginal utility of water is 
lower, the damage of their crime is larger, and the damage (or marginal disutility) of stealing from 
them is lower. Similarly, the favorable treatment of poor farmers is a consequence of efficiency: 
allowing the poor farmer to steal water during the negative shock allows saving the farmers' trees. 
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Figure 1: Trials in self-governed communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Top: Caption of a trial for the Council of Good Men in Murcia. Bottom: Map of the area under study.  
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Figure 2: Sample of Sentence. 
“En la ciudad de Mula a doce de Agosto de 
mil novecientos seis; reunidos en mayoria los 
señores de la Directiva bajo la presidencia de 
D. Gines Meseguer Caballero, se procedio a 
examinar las de-nuncias producidas contra 
Antonio Perez Sanchez, Gabriel Zapata, Jose 
Maria Egea Piñero, Juan Francisco Huescar, 
y Jose Baigal, por haber sus-traido agua de 
la acequia-mayor, para plantar patatas, 
valiendose de caballerias, hombre y mu-jeres 
provistas de cantaros. Despues que la Junta 
se entero de las excusas expuestas por los 
denunci-ados, acordo imponer a cada uno de 
ellos la multa de dos pesetas, por ser la 
primera vez que han in-currido en dicha falta, 
previniendoles que si rein-ciden en lo 
sucesivo, la multa sera mayor.” 
 
“In the city of Mula, on August 12, 1906; with 
the majority of the board under the presidency  
of Don Gines Meseguer Caballero, they 
proceeded to examine the accusations against 
Antonio Perez Sanchez, Gabriel Zapata, Jose 
Maria Egea Piñero, Juan Francisco Huescar, 
and Jose Baigal, because they stole water 
from the main canal, to irrigate potatoes, 
using horses, men and women with jugs. After 
the board learned about the excuses claimed 
by the defendants, they agreed to impose a 
fine of two pesetas, to each of them, because 
it was the first time that they incurred in such 
a misdemeanor, warning them that if they 
recidivate in the future, the fine would be 
larger.” 
 
 
Notes:  Left: Caption of the first page of a sentence, corresponding to a single trial, on August 12, 1906.  Right: 
Transcription in the original Spanish and authors' translation of the first paragraph. 
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Figure 3: Seasonality of Auctions and Guilty Dons. 
 
Panel A. Crimes: Seasonality of crimes where the defendant had Don honorific title. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Trials where there was an auction the previous week. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data using the 174 trials where the defendant was found guilty. Panel A shows the number of crimes (subset of trials 
where the defendant was found guilty), where the victim had a Don honorific title (dark) or not (light), for each month. 
Panel B shows the number of trials where there was an auction the previous week, for each month. 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics. 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
      
Guilty 0.62 0.49 0 1 282 
Dry month 0.81 0.39 0 1 282 
Victim is Don 0.26 0.44 0 1 282 
Defendant is Don 0.15 0.36 0 1 282 
Auction Dummy 0.64 0.48 0 1 282 
      
Fine 6.49 10.12 0 65 174 
Compensation 11.07 27.23 0 240.75 174 
Recidivist 0.04 0.20 0 1 174 
 
Notes: Summary statistics for selected variables. Guilty is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the defendant was found guilty 
during the trial. Fine is the amount of fine imposed on guilty defendants. Dry Month is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
alleged crime was committed during a dry month, from May to October, and 0 otherwise. Victim is Don is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the victim of the crime was an individual referred to as Don, and 0 otherwise. Defendant is Don is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the defendant was an individual referred to as Don, and 0 otherwise. Auction Dummy is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if there was an auction in the week that the crime was reported or 0 otherwise. Compensation is the 
amount that the defendant paid to the victim as recompense for the loss suffered; it represents the value of the water stolen. 
Recidivist is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the farmer who committed the crime had also committed a crime in the past, 
and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 2: Probability of Being Guilty and Farmers' Characteristics 
 
Dep. variable: guilty (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Defendant not Don -0.068 -0.220 -0.086 -0.220 -0.068 0.149 -0.074 0.149 
 (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080 ) (0.212) (0.081 ) (0.212) 
(Defendant not Don)    0.222  0.212  -0.247  -0.255 
(dry month)  (0.079)  (0.082)  (0.194)  (0.193) 
(Defendant not Don)     0.092 0.040   0.029 0.038 
(victim Don)    (0.074) (0.079)   (0.080) (0.079) 
(dry month)         
Auction dummy     0.075 0.077 0.074 0.076 
     (0.063 ) (0.063) (0.063 ) (0.063) 
Dry month     0.239 0.454 0.232 0.454 
     (0.076 ) (0.179) (0.078 ) (0.179) 
         
Number of trials 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.023 0.006 0.024 0.038 0.041 0.038 0.042 
 
Notes: All specifications are probit regressions, and include a constant that is not reported. Marginal effects are reported. 
Dependent variable is Guilty, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the defendant was found guilty during the trial. Standard 
errors corresponding to the marginal effects are in parenthesis. We obtain similar results using logit specifications. See 
Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 3: Fines and Farmers' Characteristics 
Dep. variable: Fine (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Defendant not Don -5.351  -4.066  -5.693  -4.433  
 (1.579)  (1.579)  (1.520 )  (1.519)  
Victim Don  -4.534    -4.440   
  (1.390)    (1.343)   
(Defendant not Don)    -4.778    -4.654  
(victim Don)   (1.412)    (1.353)  
Recidivist    15.067    14.651 
    (2.872)    (2.828) 
Auction dummy     -4.606 -4.348 -4.536 -4.397 
     (1.237 ) (1.248) (1.199 ) (1.196) 
Dry month     -1.738 -1.500 -1.663 0.314 
     (1.734 ) (1.746) (1.682 ) (1.700) 
         
Number of trials 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R2 0.063 0.058 0.121 0.138 0.147 0.132 0.203 0.203 
 
Notes: Sample restricted to trials where the defendant was found guilty. All specifications are OLS regressions, and 
include a constant not reported. Dependent variable is Fine, the amount of fine, measured in pesetas imposed to 
defendants when they were found guilty. Standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4: Compensations and Farmers' Characteristics. 
 
Dep. variable: Compensation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Defendant not Don 7.321  0.456  7.766  0.862  
 (5.528)  (5.277)  (5.545)  (5.290)  
Victim Don  24.990    25.360   
(Defendant not Don)  
 (4.491 )    (4.483)   
  25.524    25.495  
(victim Don)   (4.716)    (4.713)  
Recidivist    -10.676    -8.846 
    (10.506)    (10.709) 
Auction dummy     -3.177 -4.154 -3.559 -3.390 
     (4.511) (4.163) (4.178) (4.527) 
Dry month     8.666 9.326 8.259 7.075 
     (6.325) (5.826) (5.858) (6.438) 
         
Number of trials 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R2 0.010 0.153 0.155 0.006 0.022 0.168 0.166 0.015 
 
Notes: Sample restricted to trials where the defendant was found guilty. All specifications are OLS regressions, and 
include a constant not reported. Dependent variable is compensation, the amount that the defendant must pay to 
compensate the victim for the loss inflicted; it represents the value of the water stolen. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
